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Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
William H. Sandholm
Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin
Weprovethatanyregularevolutionarilystablestrategy(ESS)isasymptoticallysta-
ble under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dy-
namic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic;
and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imita-
tive dynamics, our analysis validates the use of regular ESS as a blanket sufﬁcient
condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.
Keywords. Evolutionary game dynamics, ESS.
JEL classification. C73.
1. Introduction
A basic task of evolutionary game theory is to ﬁnd conditions under which equilibrium
playisdynamicallystable. Muchoftheliteraturefocusesonglobalconvergencetoequi-
librium, identifying global payoff structures that ensure eventual equilibrium play re-
gardless of agents’ initial behavior.1 Inevitably, these requirements on payoff structure
are quite demanding: although each condition is satisﬁed in some applications, a “typi-
cal” game with many strategies does not satisfy any known condition for global conver-
gence.
To obtain stability results relevant to a wider range of games, one can turn instead to
local stability results, seeking conditions under which an equilibrium is robust to small
changesinapopulation’sbehavior. Becauseconditionsforlocalstabilityneedonlycon-
strain payoffs near the equilibrium in question, they are far easier to satisfy, and so are
more likely to be applicable.
The natural starting point for discussions of local stability is the notion of an evolu-
tionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced for single-population random matching mod-
elsbyMaynardSmithandPrice(1973). Theseauthorsenvisionamonomorphicpopula-
tion whose members all play the same mixed strategy, and they call this mixed strategy
anESSiftheincumbentpopulationiscapableofresistinginvasionsbyanysmallmutant
group whose members all play some alternative mixed strategy.2
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Most economic applications of evolutionary game theory do not proceed from this
monomorphic, mixed-strategist model, but from a polymorphic model in which agents
choose among the available pure strategies. This, for example, is the setting of the
replicator dynamic of Taylor and Jonker (1978). However, Maynard Smith and Price’s
(1973) conditions retain their importance in this new context: Taylor and Jonker (1978),
Hofbauer et al. (1979), Zeeman (1980), and Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) show that ESS
provides a sufﬁcient condition for local stability under the replicator dynamic. Because
in this setting Maynard Smith and Price’s (1973) conditions are applied to population
states—thatis, todistributions oftheagentsoverthepurestrategies—werefertoastrat-
egy distribution that satisﬁes these conditions as an evolutionarily stable state.3
Subsequent studies of local stability under evolutionary dynamics have tended to
focusoninteriorequilibria—thatis,equilibriainwhicheverypurestrategyisplayedbya
positive mass of players.4 Analyses that do not impose this restriction are less common.
The most noteworthy results in this direction are due to Cressman (1997), who studies a
general class of dynamics that captures imitative behavior. Cressman (1997)s h o w st h a t
near rest points, the linearization of any imitative dynamic preserves the basic structure
ofthelinearizationofthereplicatordynamic,whichitselfisthefundamentalexampleof
an imitative dynamic. Combining this insight with results from Taylor and Jonker (1978)
and Hines (1980), Cressman (1997) proves that in nondegenerate cases, regular ESSs are
locally stable under all imitative dynamics.5
Imitation is undoubtedly a basic component of human decision making, and most
earlyanalysesofevolutionarygamedynamicsintheeconomicsliteraturefocusonmod-
elsthatcanbeinterpretedasimitative.6 However,thedirectevaluationofstrategicalter-
natives, rather than indirect evaluation through the experiences of others, is also a basic
mode of choice; indeed, it is the approach implicitly followed in most economic and
game-theoretic modeling. Direct evaluation has a number of important consequences
for evolutionary game dynamics: strategies’ growth rates no longer need to be tied to
their current levels of utilization, and unused strategies may be chosen if agents deem
them worthwhile.
The ﬁrst evolutionary dynamic based on direct evaluation of alternative strategies
to gain wide currency in economics is the best response dynamic of Gilboa and Matsui
(1991). By having revising agents always switch to a strategy that is currently optimal,
thisdynamicoffersanaturalamalgamofinertialevolutionarymodelingandtraditional,
rational game-theoretic analysis. At the same time, optimization requires exact knowl-
edge of all strategies’ payoffs. Because evolutionary analysis is employed in settings
whereagentsintermittentlyandmyopicallyupdatetheirstrategies, theassumptionthat
3Thomas (1984) is an early reference that emphasizes the distinction between evolutionarily stable
strategies and evolutionarily stable states.
4See Hofbauer (1995b, 2001), Hopkins (1999), Hofbauer and Hopkins (2005), and Sandholm (2007).
5The formal deﬁnitions of ESS and regular ESS are presented in Section 3.
6The reason for this is in part historical. Evolutionary game dynamics were introduced in biology to
model natural selection, with game payoffs representing ﬁtnesses, and dynamics describing relative rates
of births and deaths in animal populations. Early work by economists on deterministic evolutionary game
dynamics retained this biological approach. Only later, with the work of Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996),
Weibull (1995), Schlag (1998), and Hofbauer (1995a), was it recognized that these explicitly biological mod-
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this myopic updating is done in an optimal way seems somewhat incongruous. To re-
taintheassumptionofdirectevaluationofstrategies, onecansupposeinsteadthateach
revising agent considers only a single, randomly chosen alternative to his current strat-
egy. Protocols of this sort form the basis for two families of evolutionary dynamics from
the literature. When agents compare the candidate strategy’s payoff to the population’s
average payoff, aggregate behavior is described by an excess payoff dynamic. If instead
each agent compares the candidate strategy’s payoff to the payoff of his current strat-
egy, aggregate behavior is described by a pairwise comparison dynamic.T h e Brown–
von Neumann–Nash (BNN) dynamic (Brown and von Neumann 1950)a n dt h eSmith
dynamic (Smith 1984)areearlyexamplesfrom thesetwoclasses ofdynamics; onlymore
recently have excess payoff dynamics and pairwise comparison dynamics been studied
systematically.7
Allofthedirectevaluationdynamicsdescribedabovedifferfromimitativedynamics
in crucial ways: they allow agents to switch to unused strategies and they do not exhibit
the percentage-growth-rate functional form that is characteristic of imitative dynamics.




parison dynamics, which include the Smith dynamic as a special case, under separable
excess payoff dynamics, which include the BNN dynamic, and under the best response
dynamic. By modifying Lyapunov functions used by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009)t o
study evolution in stable games, we prove that any regular ESS is locally asymptotically
stable under all of the dynamics in the classes noted above. Combined with Cressman’s
(1997) results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of regular ESS as a
blanket sufﬁcient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces population games and evo-
lutionary dynamics, and presents the classes of dynamics under study. Section 3 de-
ﬁnes the notions of ESS and regular ESS. Section 4 presents our local stability theorem,
describes the intuition behind its proof, and compares this analysis with local stability
analysesforimitativedynamics. Section 5 presentsextensionstomultipopulationmod-
els. Section 6 offers concluding discussion. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2. The model
2.1 Population games
To keep the notation manageable, we focus ﬁrst on games played by a single population
of agents. Analogous results for multipopulation models are presented in Section 5.
7See Weibull (1996), Hofbauer (2001), and Sandholm (2005, 2010).
8Indeed, Friedman (1991, p. 656) suggests that ESS should not be viewed as a general sufﬁcient condi-
tion for local stability. Furthermore, imitative dynamics are known to have special properties in related
contexts. Samuelson and Zhang (1992) prove that under imitative dynamics, a strictly dominated strategy
must vanish along any interior solution trajectory, but Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007) show that any con-
tinuous evolutionary dynamic that is not purely imitative allows dominated strategies to survive in some
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Wesupposethatthereisaunitmassofagents,eachofwhomchoosesapurestrategy
from the set S ={ 1     n}. The aggregate behavior of these agents is described by a
populationstate x ∈ X,w h e r eX ={ x ∈ Rn
+:

j∈S xj = 1} isthesimplexand xj represents
the proportion of agents who choose pure strategy j.
We identify a population game with a continuously differentiable payoff function
F :X → Rn. The scalar Fi(x) represents the payoff to strategy i when the population
state is x,a n dt h em a t r i xDF(x) ∈ Rn×n denotes the derivative of F at x.W el e t¯ F(x)= 
j∈S xjFj(x)denotetheaveragepayoff obtainedbythemembersofthepopulation,and
we let ˆ Fi(x) = Fi(x) − ¯ F(x) denote the excess payoff to strategy i over the population’s
average payoff.
Thesimplestpopulationgamesarethosewithlinearpayoffs,forwhichthereisama-
trix A ∈ Rn×n such that Fi(x) =

j∈S Aijxj.9 In this case, the payoffs to all strategies can
be expressed concisely as F(x)= Ax, implying that DF(x) = A. More generally, payoffs
may depend nonlinearly on the population state. For example, if we use a population
game to model network congestion, then the payoff from using a given link is constant
at low levels of trafﬁc, but falls steeply as the link nears its capacity.10 None of the results
to follow requires payoffs to be linear: the continuous differentiability of F is all that is
needed for our analysis to hold.
2.2 Revision protocols and evolutionary dynamics
To derive evolutionary dynamics from a model of individual decision making, we in-
troduce revision protocols, which describe how agents adjust their choices of strategies
during recurrent play of the game at hand. Formally, a revision protocol is a Lipschitz
continuous map ρ:Rn × X → Rn×n
+ that takes payoff vectors π and population states x
asarguments,andreturnsnonnegativematricesasoutputs. Thescalar ρij(π x) iscalled
the conditional switch rate from strategy i to strategy j. If we imagine that agents re-
ceive revision opportunities independently according to rate R Poisson processes, then
ρij(π x)/R represents the probability that an i player who receives a revision opportu-
nity switches to strategy j  = i.11 This framework allows for the possibility that agents
observe all strategies’ current payoffs and utilization levels, but in many cases the infor-
mation requirements are much weaker than this; see the examples below.
A revision protocol ρ and a population game F together deﬁne an ordinary differen-







ρij(F(x) x)  (M)
Equation (M) is called the mean dynamic generated by ρ and F.T h eﬁ r s tt e r mi n( M)
9Onecould interpret Fi(x) hereasrepresentingtheexpectedpayoffofarandommatchinthesymmetric
normal form game A. This is not our preferred interpretation, because in the subsequent model of strategy
revision, Fi(x) is best viewed as a realized payoff. Toretain a matching interpretation, one can view Fi(x) as
a realized payoff if each agent is matched once with every opponent. See Section 6 for further discussion.
10For more on large-population congestion games, see Beckmann et al. (1956) and Sandholm (2001).
11Note that the rate R must be large enough that

j =i ρij(π x)/R never exceeds 1, and that the diagonal
elements of ρ(π x) play no formal role in the model.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics 31
capturestheinﬂowofagentstostrategyi fromotherstrategies,whereasthesecondterm
captures the outﬂow of agents to other strategies from strategy i.
Deriving evolutionary dynamics from revision protocols not only allows us to study
the aggregate implications of different rules for individual choice, but also lets us ﬁnd
microfoundations for existing dynamics. For instance, the replicator dynamic




cator dynamic can be viewed as a model of payoff-dependent imitation. One revision
protocol that generates this dynamic is pairwise proportional imitation,12
ρij(π x) = xj[πj −πi]+  (2)
where [d]+ = max{d 0} is the positive part of d.T h exj term in this protocol reﬂects the
fact that a revising agent picks a candidate strategy by observing the current strategy of
a randomly chosen opponent. The agent switches to the opponent’s strategy if its payoff
is higher than that of his own current strategy, doing so with probability proportional
to the payoff difference. Substituting protocol (2) into equation (M) and simplifying the
result yields the replicator dynamic (1).
2.3 Families of evolutionary dynamics
Thisapproachtodynamicsviarevisionprotocolsalsoallowsustodeﬁnefamiliesofevo-
lutionary dynamics, where members of the same family are derived from qualitatively
similar protocols.
Example 1. Animitative dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic of the form
˙ xi = xiGi(x)  (3)
where the C1 map G:Rn → Rn satisﬁes monotone percentage growth rates:
Gi(x) ≥ Gj(x) if and only if Fi(x) ≥ Fj(x)  (4)
as well as the forward invariance condition x G(x) = 0 (see equation (13)b e l o w ) .T h e
simplest and best-known imitative dynamic, the replicator dynamic (1), is obtained
when G(x) is the excess payoff function ˆ F(x)= F(x)−1 ¯ F(x),w h e r e1 ∈ Rn is the vector
of ones.
Imitative dynamics can be derived from revision protocols of the imitative form
ρij(π x) = xjrij(π x)  where for all i j k ∈ S 
πj ≥ πi if and only if rkj(π x)−rjk(π x) ≥ rki(π x)−rik(π x) 
12This protocol is due to Schlag (1998). Other imitative protocols that generate the replicator dynamic
can be found in Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996), Weibull (1995), and Hofbauer (1995a).32 William H. Sandholm Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
The imitative aspect of these protocols is manifested by the xj term, the presence of
which leads the dynamic (3) to take a simple percentage-growth-rate form. For more
on the foundations of imitative dynamics, see Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996), Weibull
(1995), Hofbauer (1995a), and Sandholm et al. (2008). ♦
Under imitative protocols, agents select candidate strategies by observing their op-
ponents’ behavior.13 Under the protocols to follow, agents instead choose candidate
strategies directly, allowing them to switch to unused strategies whose payoffs are sufﬁ-
ciently appealing.
Example 2. Suppose that the rate at which current strategy i players switch to the can-
didatestrategy j dependsonlyonthepayoffdifferencebetweenthem,andthatswitches
to better-performing strategies are the only ones that have positive probability. Such
rules are described by revision protocols of the form
ρij(π x) = φij(πj −πi) 
where each function φij is sign-preserving, in the sense that sgn(φij(d)) = sgn([d]+).14
Dynamics (M) generated by protocols of this form are called pairwise comparison dy-
namics (Sandholm 2010). We call such a dynamic impartial if φij ≡ φj, so that the func-
tion of the payoff difference that describes the conditional switch rate from i to j does
not depend on an agent’s current strategy i. The simplest example of a pairwise com-









Even in this simple case, we obtain an equation of motion that is noticeably more com-
plicated than the general imitative dynamic (3). ♦
Example 3. Suppose that the rate at which agents switch from strategy i to strategy j
is solely a function of strategy j’s excess payoff, and that agents switch only to strategies
whose payoffs exceed the population average. Such rules are represented by protocols
of the form








where each function φj is sign-preserving: sgn(φj(d)) = sgn([d]+). We call the dynam-
ics (M) generated by protocols of this form separable excess payoff dynamics. Choosing
φj(d) =[ d]+ yields the BNN dynamic (Brown and von Neumann 1950):
˙ xi =[ˆ Fi(x)]+ −xi

j∈S
[ ˆ Fj(x)]+ 
13Of course, the decision about whether to actually switch to the candidate strategy will depend on the
current strategy’s payoff, the candidate strategy’s payoff, or both.
14More explicitly, φij(d) > 0 if d>0 and φij(d) = 0 if d ≤ 0.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics 33
For more on this and other examples of excess payoff dynamics, see Skyrms (1990),
Swinkels (1993), Weibull (1996), Hofbauer (2001), and Sandholm (2005). ♦
Example 4. To obtain a dynamic that reﬂects myopic optimization, one can suppose
that revising agents always switch to a best response: ρi•(π x) = argmaxy∈X y π.T h e n
aggregate behavior is described by the best response dynamic (Gilboa and Matsui 1991;
also see Hofbauer 1995b):
˙ x ∈ argmax
y∈X
y F(x)−x 
The best response dynamic is not a (single-valued) differential equation, but a (mul-
tivalued)differentialinclusion: theremaybemultiplefeasibledirectionsofmotionfrom
states at which more than one strategy is optimal. Therefore, our derivation here is
somewhat informal, taking a multivalued revision protocol as its basis. It is possible,
though, to provide a precise account of evolutionary processes based on multivalued
protocols; see Benaïm et al. (2005)a n dGorodeisky (2008, 2009). ♦
3. Evolutionarily stable states
We now introduce our sufﬁcient condition for local stability. To begin, we call x∗ ∈ X an
evolutionarily stable state if
(y −x∗) F(x∗) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ X (5)
there is a neighborhood O ⊂ X of x∗ such that for all y ∈ O −{x∗} 
(y −x∗) F(x∗) = 0 implies that (y −x∗) F(y)<0 
(6)
Condition (5)s a y st h a tx∗ is a Nash equilibrium. Condition (6)r e q u i r e st h a ti fas t a t e
y near x∗ is an alternative best response to x∗, then an inﬁnitesimal group of invaders
whose aggregate behavior is described by x∗ can invade an incumbent population play-
ing y.15 If F(x)= Ax is linear, then the force of condition (6) does not change if we
require the implication to hold for all y ∈ X −{ x∗}, as originally speciﬁed by Maynard
Smith and Price (1973) in this linear setting.16
To prove their local stability results for the replicator dynamic, Taylor and Jonker
(1978) introduce the slightly stronger notion of a regular ESS, which is deﬁned by the
following two conditions:
Fi(x∗) = ¯ F(x∗)>F j(x∗) whenever x∗
i > 0 and x∗
j = 0 (7)
for all y ∈ X −{x∗} (y−x∗) F(x∗) = 0 implies that (y −x∗) DF(x∗)(y −x∗)<0  (8)
Condition (7)s a y st h a tx∗ is a quasistrict equilibrium: a Nash equilibrium at which each
unused strategy performs strictly worse than each strategy in use. Condition (8)s a y s
15To see this, notice that the inequality in condition (6) can be rewritten as (x∗) F(y)>y F(y).O t h e r
equivalent characterizations of ESS can be found in Bomze and Weibull (1995).
16This follows from the fact that every y ∈ X −{x∗} satisﬁes y −x∗ = c(w−x∗) for some w ∈ O −{x∗} and
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that as the state moves from x∗ toward an alternate best response y (that is, in direction
y − x∗), the payoff advantage of x∗ over y grows at a linear rate. Condition (8)i se q u i v a -
lent to condition (6)w h e nF is linear (e.g., when F is generated by matching in a normal
form game), but is slightly stronger than condition (6) when nonlinear payoffs are al-
lowed.
Example 5. The conditions for regular ESS are only slightly more demanding than
those for ESS, as can be seen by looking at instances of games with nonregular ESSs.
First, consider the two-strategy game deﬁned by F1(x) = 1 and F2(x) = x1−ε.A sl o n ga s
ε ≥ 0, state e1 = (1 0) is the unique Nash equilibrium of F and an ESS of F. However, for
e1 to be a regular ESS, it must be that ε>0,s ot h a te1 is a quasistrict (and even a strict)
equilibrium.
Next, consider the two-strategy game deﬁned by F1(x) = (x2 − 1
2)3 + ε(x2 − 1
2) and
F2(x) = 0.F o ra n yε ≥ 0, state x∗ = (1
2  1
2) is the unique Nash equilibrium of F and an
ESS of F. However, if ε = 0,t h e nDF(x∗) = 0, so condition (8) clearly fails. For instance,
lettingy = e2,wehavethat(e2−x∗) DF(x∗)(e2−x∗) = 0 Inwords,thisequalitysaysthat
if the population begins at equilibrium x∗, and if some agents switch from strategy 1 to
strategy 2, then although the payoff to strategy 2 falls below the payoff to mixed strategy
x∗, strategy 2’s payoff disadvantage initially does not grow at a linear rate. If instead









so the payoff disadvantage of strategy 2 relative to x∗ does grow at a linear rate:
(e2−x∗) DF(x∗)(e2−x∗) =−1
4(∂F1/∂x2)(x∗) =−1
4ε<0.T h u s ,w h e nε>0,condition(8)
is satisﬁed and x∗ is a regular ESS. The presence of the nonlinear payoff function in this
example is no accident: as we noted above, nonlinear payoffs are necessary for discrep-
ancies between conditions (6)a n d( 8) to occur. ♦
It will be useful to have a more concise formulation of regular ESS. To this end, let
TX={ z ∈ Rn:

j∈S zj = 0} denote the tangent space of X,l e tS(x)={ j ∈ S:xj > 0} de-
note the support of state x,a n dl e tRn
S(x) ={ y ∈ Rn:yj = 0 whenever j/ ∈ S(x)} denote the
s e to fv e c t o r si nRn whose nonzero components correspond to strategies in the support
of x.
Observation 1. State x∗ is a regular ESS if and only if it is a quasistrict equilibrium (7)
that satisﬁes
z DF(x∗)z < 0 for all nonzero z ∈ TX∩Rn
S(x∗)  (9)
In words, state x∗ is a regular ESS if it is a quasistrict equilibrium, and if the pay-
off derivative matrix DF(x∗) is negative deﬁnite with respect to TX∩ Rn
S(x∗),t h es e to f
vectors tangent to the face of X containing x∗.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics 35
4. Local stability
4.1 The main result
To prepare for our main result, we review the relevant notions of stability for dynamical
systems. Let x∗ be a rest point of the dynamic (M). We say that x∗ is Lyapunov stable
if for every neighborhood O of x∗, there exists a neighborhood O  of x∗ such that every
solution {xt}t≥0 of (M)t h a ts t a r t si nO  is contained in O:t h a ti s ,x0 ∈ O  implies that
xt ∈ O for all t ≥ 0. The rest point x∗ is attracting if there is a neighborhood ˆ O of x∗ such
that every solution that starts in ˆ O converges to x∗. Finally, x∗ is asymptotically stable if
it is Lyapunov stable and attracting.
Taylor and Jonker (1978)a n dHines (1980) prove that any regular ESS is asymptot-
ically stable under the replicator dynamic (1) by showing that the eigenvalues of the
relevant linearized system have negative real parts. Cressman (1997) extends this lin-
earization analysis to general imitative dynamics. We describe these analyses in detail
in Section 4.3.
M e m b e r so ft h eo t h e rc l a s s e so fd y n a m i c si n t r o d u c e di nSection 2.3 often fail to be
differentiable, so we cannot use linearization to obtain local stability results. Instead, by
constructing suitable Lyapunov functions, we prove thatany regularESS is locallystable
under the classes of dynamics from Examples 2, 3,a n d4.
Theorem 1. Let x∗ be a regular ESS of F.T h e nx∗ is asymptotically stable under
(i) any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic for F;
(ii) any separable excess payoff dynamic for F;
(iii) the best response dynamic for F.
4.2 Intuition for the main result
We now provide the intuition behind the proof of Theorem 1. The complete proof is
presented in the Appendix.
The proof of the theorem builds on analyses from Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009)o f
evolutionary dynamics in stable games. A population game F is a strictly stable game if
z DF(x)z < 0 for all nonzero z ∈ TXand all x ∈ X 
Thatis, F isastrictlystablegameifatallstates x ∈ X, thepayoffderivativematrix DF(x)
is negative deﬁnite with respect to directions tangent to X.
By constructing suitable global Lyapunov functions, Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009)
show that the Nash equilibrium of any strictly stable game is unique and that it is glob-
ally asymptotically stable under the dynamics considered in Theorem 1.T h eL y a p u n o v


















(y −x) F(x) 
respectively. In the ﬁrst two cases, theLyapunov functions depend not only on thegame
F, but also on the exact speciﬁcation of the dynamic: the latter dependence is through
the appearance of the conditional switch rate functions φj in the formulas for   and  .
To see why this analysis is relevant here, recall from Observation 1 that a regular
ESS x∗ is a quasistrict equilibrium whose payoff derivative matrix DF(x∗) is negative
deﬁnite with respect to directions in TX∩Rn
S(x∗). If all strategies are in use at x∗,t h i ss e t
of directions is just TX,s ot h a tF resembles a stable game near x∗.T h u s ,i fx∗ ∈ int(X),
theglobalLyapunovfunctionsforstablegamesgivenabovealsoserveaslocalLyapunov
functions for the ESS x∗.
Suppose instead that x∗ / ∈ int(X),s ot h a ta tl e a s to n ep u r es t r a t e g yi su n u s e da tx∗.
Because x∗ is a quasistrict equilibrium, all unused strategies earn strictly lower payoffs
than strategies in the support of x∗; because payoffs are continuous, this is true not only
at x∗ itself, but also at states near x∗. Under any dynamic that respects these payoff dif-
ferences,solutionsfrominitialconditionsnearx∗ shouldapproachXx∗ ={ x ∈ X :S(x)=
S(x∗)},t h ef a c eo fX that contains x∗.I fx∗ is a pure state (i.e., a vertex of X), and thus
a strict equilibrium, then Xx∗ is simply the singleton {x∗}, and the foregoing argument
sufﬁces to prove local stability.17
Now, assume that x∗ is neither in the interior nor at a vertex of X, and suppose that
we conﬁne our attention to the behavior of the dynamic on face Xx∗ in the vicinity of
x∗. One way to do so is to consider a restricted game in which only the strategies in
the support of x∗ are available. Condition (9) can be interpreted as saying that this re-
stricted game resembles a stable game near x∗. By this logic, the Lyapunov functions
from Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) can be used to establish convergence to x∗ from
nearby initial conditions on face Xx∗.
To prove Theorem 1, we need to construct local Lyapunov functions whose value
decreases not only along solutions on face Xx∗, but also along solutions in the interior
of X starting near x∗. To do so, we augment each of the Lyapunov functions listed above
by an additional term. For impartial pairwise comparison dynamics, we replace the
original Lyapunov function   with the function
 x∗(x) =  (x)+C x∗(x) 
where  x∗(x) =

j/ ∈S(x∗)xj is the mass placed on strategies outside the support of x∗,
and C>0 is a constant. For the other classes of dynamics, the term C x∗(x) is added to
the functions   and M above.
When the current state x is in the interior of X, the value of   need not decrease.
However, if x is close to x∗, then the value of  x∗ does decrease, because agents playing
17In particular, the function  x∗ introduced below is a local Lyapunov function at x∗ in this case: see
Lemmas 1(ii), 2(ii), and 3(ii) in the Appendix.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics 37
strategies outside of S(x∗) switch to strategies in S(x∗),t h o u g ht h er a t eo fd e c r e a s eo f
 x∗ approaches zero as the state approaches the boundary of X. To prove the theorem,
we must show that if the constant C is large enough, then the value of C x∗ always falls
fast enough to compensate for any growth in the value of  , so that all told, the value of
 x∗ falls. The arguments required to accomplish this are somewhat different for each of
the three classes of dynamics considered in the theorem: see Lemmas 1, 2,a n d3 in the
Appendix.
The argument just described requires precise estimates of the behavior of  ,  , M,
and  x∗ in a neighborhood of x∗, and these estimates take full advantage of the regular
ESS conditions (7)a n d( 8). Still, it seems possible that the conclusions of Theorem 1
could be extended to cases where x∗ only satisﬁes the ESS conditions, (5)a n d( 6). One
can prove by elementary arguments that when F has just two strategies, any ESS is lo-
cally stable under the dynamics considered in Theorem 1. Moreover, a close examina-
tion of the proof of Theorem 1(iii) reveals that in the case of the best response dynamic,
the quasistrictness condition (7) from the deﬁnition of regular ESS can be replaced with
the weaker requirement
there is a neighborhood O ⊂ X of x∗ such that for all y ∈ O −{x∗} 
Fi(y) ≥ Fj(y) whenever x∗
i > 0 and x∗
j = 0  with Fi(y) > Fj(y) if yj > 0 
which allows for unused optimal strategies both at the equilibrium x∗ and elsewhere on
faces of X that contain x∗. Whether the conclusions of Theorem 1 can be extended to
all ESSs of arbitrary population games is an open question.
4.3 Comparison to stability analysis for imitative dynamics
The proofs of asymptotic stability of regular ESS under pairwise comparison dynamics,
excess payoff dynamics, and the best response dynamic, though differing in their de-
tails, all follow the same basic path, using augmented versions of Lyapunov functions
for stable games. In contrast, Cressman’s (1997) proof of asymptotic stability of regu-
lar ESS under imitative dynamics employs a different approach based on linearization.
HerewepresentaversionofCressman’s (1997)analysis, andcontrastitwiththeanalysis
of direct evaluation dynamics proposed here.
Given a dynamic ˙ x = V( x )deﬁned on a full-dimensional set in Rn, the asymptotic
stability of the rest point x∗ can be established by showing that all eigenvalues of the
derivative matrix DV (x∗) have negative real parts. Because the state space for evolu-
tionary gamedynamics is thesimplex X, thelocalstability oftherest point x∗ can bees-
tablished by showing that the “relevant eigenvalues” of DV (x∗) have negative real parts,
where by “relevant eigenvalues” we mean those that correspond to eigenvectors in (the
complexiﬁcation of) the n − 1-dimensional tangent space TX={ z ∈ Rn:z 1 = 0}.I fw e
let   = I −(1/n)11  ∈ Rn×n denote the orthogonal projection of Rn onto TX, then these
relevant eigenvalues are also the eigenvalues of DV (x∗)  that correspond to eigenvec-
tors in TX.38 William H. Sandholm Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Let us write the general imitative dynamic (3)a s
˙ x = V( x )= diag(x)G(x)  (12)
where the C1 function G satisﬁes monotone percentage growth rates (4). To ensure that
the simplex is forward invariant under (12), we must have V( x )∈ TXor, equivalently,
x G(x) = 0  (13)
Notice that if we set G = ˆ F,t h e n( 12) becomes the replicator dynamic (1).
We can compute the derivative matrix of V at state x as
DV (x) = Q(x)DG(x)−xG(x)  +diag(G(x))  (14)
where Q(x) = diag(x) − xx  ∈ Rn×n.I fx∗ ∈ int(X) is an interior Nash equilibrium, then
the monotonicity condition (4) and the identity (13)i m p l yt h a tG(x∗) = 0, and hence
that
DV (x∗)  = Q(x∗)DG(x∗)   (15)
Because Q(x) is symmetric, positive deﬁnite with respect to TX× TX,a n dm a p s1 to
0, a lemma of Hines (1980) implies that the relevant eigenvalues of DV (x∗) will have
negative real parts if DG(x∗) is negative deﬁnite with respect to TX×TX.
Now suppose that x∗ ∈ int(X) is a regular ESS. Then by Observation 1, DF(x∗) is
negative deﬁnite with respect to TX× TX. To take advantage of this fact, Cressman
(1997)p r o v e st h a t
 DG(x∗)  = c DF(x∗)  for some c ≥ 0  (16)
Thatis, atanyinterior Nashequilibrium, thelinearization ofanymonotonepercentage-
growth-rate function G is a multiple of the linearization of the payoff function F.T o -
gether, (15), (16), and the lemma of Hines (1980) imply that in nondegenerate cases
(c  = 0), an interior regular ESS is asymptotically stable.
Suppose next that x∗ is a boundary Nash equilibrium with support {1     
n∗},w h e r en∗ <n . In this case, the upper left n∗ × n∗ block of DV (x∗) is an n∗ × n∗
analogue of equation (15). Thus, if x∗ is a regular ESS, a version of the argument above
shows that in nondegenerate cases, this block generates n∗ − 1 relevant eigenvalues of
DV (x∗) with a negative real part. The lower right block of DV (x∗), whose source is the
third summand in (14), is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries {Gj(x∗)}n
j=n∗+1;t h a t
each of these n − n∗ entries can be shown to be a relevant eigenvalue of DV (x∗).H o w -
ever, if x∗ is a regular ESS, and thus a quasistrict equilibrium (7), then monotonicity
condition (4)i m p l i e st h a tGj(x∗)<0 for all j>n ∗. Therefore, in nondegenerate cases,
all (n∗ − 1) + (n − n∗) = n − 1 relevant eigenvalues of DV (x∗) have negative real parts,
implying that the regular ESS x∗ is asymptotically stable.
Cressman’s (1997) analysis of imitative dynamics and our analysis of direct evalua-
tion dynamics have some broad features in common. In both cases, the negative deﬁ-
niteness of DF(x∗) is used to control the growth of strategies in the support of x∗,a n d
the quasistrictness of x∗ is used to show that small incursions by unused strategies areTheoretical Economics 5 (2010) Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics 39
eliminated. Thus, in both cases, the full strength of regular ESS is called upon to estab-
lish local stability.
In most other respects, though, the analyses are quite different. Cressman’s (1997)
analysis takes advantage of the simple functional form (12) of imitative dynamics, and
relies on the surprising fact that all of these dynamics behave similarly in the neigh-
borhood of an equilibrium. Moreover, this analysis requires the assumption that the
dynamic is nondegenerately differentiable: when condition (16) holds with c  = 0, lin-
earization allows us to separate the analyses of strategies inside and outside the support
of x∗.
Our analysis of direct evaluation dynamics differs on each of these points. The
dependence of the Lyapunov functions (10)a n d( 11) on the revision protocol φ sug-
gests that different dynamics exhibit different behavior in the vicinity of x∗.M o r e -
over, becauseallofthebasicexamplesofdirectevaluationdynamics—Smith, BNN,best
response—arenotdifferentiable,ourstabilityanalysismustbebasedonLyapunovfunc-
tions. Because we do not use linearization, we cannot cleanly separate the analyses of
strategies inside and outside of the support of x∗. Indeed, the role of Lemmas 1, 2,a n d3
istoshowthattheforcesthatequilibratetheuseofstrategiesinthesupportof x∗ arenot
too badly compromised as the strategies outside the support of x∗ are being eliminated.
An alternate possibility for unifying the analyses of imitative and direct evaluation
dynamics is to construct Lyapunov functions for the former dynamics. In the case of
the replicator dynamic, it is well known from the work of Hofbauer et al. (1979), Zeeman









serves as a local Lyapunov function for the ESS x∗. However, this function seems unre-
lated to the Lyapunov functions considered in this paper, and no generalizations of this
function for other imitative dynamics are known.
5. Multipopulation games
In this section, we explain how our local stability results extend to multipopulation
settings.
Before proceeding, we should brieﬂy discuss a well-known result of Selten (1980)
(see also Weibull 1995) that shows that in multipopulation games deﬁned by ran-
dom matching, various formulations of ESS are equivalent to strict equilibrium. More
broadly, this equivalence between ESS and strict equilibrium holds in any multipopula-
tion game in which each agent’s payoffs are independent of the choices of other agents
in his own population. Although this form of payoff independence is always present in
random matching contexts, it seems rather exceptional in “playing the ﬁeld” models, in40 William H. Sandholm Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
whichagents’ payoffsdepend directlyonopponents’ aggregatebehavior.18 Insuch con-
texts, which are common in applications of population games, the notions of ESS in-
troduced below are not especially more restrictive than those for the single-population
setting.
To deﬁne a multipopulation game, we suppose that there are p > 1 populations of
agents, with population p ∈ P ={ 1     p} having mass mp > 0. Agents in population
p choose pure strategies from the set Sp ={ 1     np}, and the total number of pure
strategies available in all populations is n =

p∈P np. Aggregate behavior in population





i = mp},w h e r ex
p
i ∈
R+ represents the mass of players in population p choosing strategy i ∈ Sp. Elements
of X =

p∈P Xp ={ x = (x1     xp) ∈ Rn
+:xp ∈ Xp},t h es e to fsocial states,d e s c r i b e






i = 0} and TX=

p∈P TXp, respectively.
We identify a multipopulation game with its C1 payoff function F :X → Rn.T h e
componentF
p
i :X → Rdenotesthepayofffunctionforstrategyi ∈ Sp,wher easFp:X →
Rnp
denotes the payoff functions for all strategies in Sp. To interpret the deﬁnitions be-
low, note that inner products of elements of Rn are deﬁned via sums that range over all
strategies in all populations: for instance, the aggregate payoff over all p populations at









In this context, a strictly stable game is a game whose derivative matrices that satisfy
the (multipopulation) negative deﬁniteness condition
z DF(x)z < 0 for all nonzero z ∈ TXand all x ∈ X  (17)
TheLyapunovfunctionsintroducedinHofbauerandSandholm(2009)continuetoserve
in multipopulation games in which this condition holds.
To use these functions as the starting point for a local stability analysis, we follow
Taylor (1979) and use a deﬁnition of ESS that, like condition (17), makes use of payoff
comparisons that aggregate over all populations. In particular, we call x∗ ∈ X a Taylor
ESS if it is a Nash equilibrium that satisﬁes
there is a neighborhood O ⊂ X of x∗ such that for all y ∈ O −{x∗} 
(y −x∗) F(x∗) = 0 implies that (y −x∗) F(y)<0 
(18)
Strengthening this deﬁnition slightly, we call x∗ a regular Taylor ESS if it is a quasistrict
equilibrium that satisﬁes
for all y ∈ X −{x∗} (y−x∗) F(x∗) = 0 implies that (y −x∗) DF(x∗)(y −x∗)<0  (19)
By extending arguments from Taylor and Jonker (1978), Taylor (1979) shows that any
regular Taylor ESS is asymptotically stable under the (standard) multipopulation repli-
18For instance, in multipopulation models of trafﬁc congestion, each population corresponds to an ori-
gin/destination pair. Clearly, the delays a driver experiences should depend not only on the behavior of
drivers with other origin/destination pairs, but also on the behavior of other drivers with the same ori-
gin/destination pair.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics 41
cator dynamic. Similarly, a simple extension of our analysis shows that a regular Taylor
ESS is asymptotically stable under multipopulation versions of all of the dynamics con-
sidered in Theorem 1.19
The inequalities in conditions (18)a n d( 19) require that the aggregate payoffs of the
p incumbent populations exceed the aggregate payoffs of the p invading populations.
A less demanding solution concept can be obtained by requiring only that there be at
least one population p ∈ P in which incumbents outperform invaders:
there is a neighborhood O ⊂ X of x∗ such that for all y ∈ O −{x∗} there is a p ∈ P
(20)
such that (yp −x∗p) Fp(x∗) = 0 implies that (yp −x∗p) Fp(y) < 0 
We call a Nash equilibrium that satisﬁes condition (20)aCressman ESS.20
As we noted at the beginning of the paper, Maynard Smith and Price’s (1973)d e -
ﬁnition of ESS serves as a stability condition in two distinct single-population con-
texts: the monomorphic, mixed-strategist framework these authors envisioned, and the
polymorhphic, pure-strategist framework ﬁrst studied by Taylor and Jonker (1978). In
multipopulation settings, both of these roles cannot be played by a single deﬁnition.
Cressman (1992, 2006)a n dCressman et al. (2001) argue convincingly that to capture
stability in the multipopulation analogue of Maynard Smith and Price’s (1973)m i x e d -
strategistframework, theappropriatesolutionconceptisCressmanESS.21 However, fol-
lowing Taylor (1979), we have argued here that in the context of multipopulation pure-
strategist dynamics, it is the more demanding notion of Taylor ESS that provides a gen-
eral sufﬁcient condition for local stability.
6. Discussion
We study the evolution of behavior in population games, assuming that agents employ
revision protocols based on the direct evaluation of alternative strategies. We show that
under three classes of dynamics generated by such protocols—impartial pairwise com-
parison dynamics, separable excess payoff dynamics, and the best response dynamic—
any regular ESS is locally stable. To conclude the paper, we now discuss some of the
assumptions maintained throughout the analysis and suggest directions for future re-
search.
19In deﬁning these multipopulation dynamics, we can allow different populations to employ different
revision protocols from the same class (e.g., from the class of protocols that deﬁnes impartial pairwise
comparisondynamics). Amongotherthings, thisﬂexibilitycanbeusedtooffsetdifferencesinpayoffscales
across populations.
20This concept is called monomorphic ESS in Cressman (1992), and N-species ESS in Cressman et al.
(2001) and Cressman (2006). A related notion for two-population games is that of a Nash–Pareto pair;s e e
Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988).
21Cressman (1992, 2006) and Cressman et al. (2001) consider a collection of p-dimensional replicator
systems, with one system for each strategy proﬁle y other than the candidate for stability, x∗.T h epth com-
ponentof the statevariablein the p-dimensionalsystemdescribes the fraction of the pth populationusing
the invading mixed strategy yp; the remainder of the population uses the incumbent mixed strategy x∗p.I t
is shown that the origin (i.e., the state at which all members of each population p choose the incumbent
mixed strategy x∗p) is asymptotically stable in each such system if and only if x∗ is a Cressman ESS.42 William H. Sandholm Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
All of our analysis is conducted in a population game framework in which the payoff
Fi(x), which is used as an input of the agents’ revision protocols, represents a realized
payoff. This framework includes congestion games and similar models of multilateral
externalities, the “playing the ﬁeld” models of Maynard Smith (1982), and contests gen-
erated by the deterministic matching of all pairs of agents in normal form games. If F
were generated instead by a single round of random matching in the normal form game
A,t h e nFi(x) = (Ax)i would represent the expected payoff to strategy i.I n t h i s c a s e ,
agents would need to observe the population state and compute expected payoffs in
order to employ the revision protocols studied here. Because these requirements seem
rather stringent for evolutionary modeling, it would be more natural in this context to
assume that each agent employs a revision protocol that conditions directly on the out-
comesof his randommatches. Although Schlag(1998)derives thereplicatordynamic in
suchanenvironment,littleworkhasbeendonetoformulatedirectevaluationdynamics
in this setting, leaving a promising avenue for future research.
The present paper studies local stability in recurrent play of simultaneous-move
games. Understanding local stability in recurring sequential-move games is a topic of
clear importance, but it introduces a number of complications to the analysis. Deriv-
ing evolutionary dynamics for extensive form games from a speciﬁcation of individual
behavior necessitates the use of revision protocols that incorporate agents’ assessments
of the consequences of diverting play to unreached information sets. Because dynam-
ics developed for simultaneous move games do not account for such possibilities, it is
not surprising that these dynamics can exhibit unexpected properties in extensive form
games, or that few general stability results exist.22 Finally, because unreached infor-
mation sets generate components of observationally equivalent equilibria, set-valued
analogues of the ESS concept can be expected to play a basic role in studies of local sta-
bility for extensive form games.23 Whether the analyses developed in Cressman (1997)
and in the present paper can be adapted to dynamics for extensive form games is thus a
difﬁcult open question.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1(i). Let ˙ x = VF(x) be an impartial pairwise comparison dynamic
for F deﬁned by revision protocol ρij(π x) = φj(πj −πi),a n dl e tψk(d) =
 d
0 φk(s)ds be
the deﬁnite integral of φk.D e ﬁ n et h eC1 function  x∗ :X → R by










22Cressman (2003) provides a thorough account of these issues and takes the ﬁrst steps toward deﬁning
deterministic dynamics that respect extensive form structure.
23For set-valued versions of ESS, see Thomas (1985), Swinkels (1992), and Balkenborg and Schlag (2001,
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where the constant C>0 is determined later. Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009)o b s e r v e
that the function   is nonnegative, with  (x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ NE(F). It follows
that  x∗ too is nonnegative, with  x∗(x) = 0 if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium of
F with support(x) ⊆ support(x∗).B e c a u s e x∗ is an ESS, it is isolated in the set of Nash
equilibria (see Bomze and Weibull 1995), so there is a neighborhood O of x∗ on which x∗
is the unique zero of  x∗. If we can show that there is also a neighborhood O  of x∗ such
that ˙  x∗(x) < 0 for all x ∈ O  −{ x∗},t h e n x∗ is a strict local Lyapunov function for x∗,
implying that x∗ is asymptotically stable (see Weibull 1995).
To reduce the amount of notation in the analysis to come, let 10 ∈ Rn be the vector
whose jth component equals 0 if j ∈ support(x∗) and equals 1 otherwise, so that (10) x is
the mass of agents who use strategies outside the support of x∗ at state x.T h e nw ec a n
write  x∗(x) =  (x)+C(10) x, and so can express the time derivative of  x∗ as
˙  x∗(x) = ˙  (x)+C(10) ˙ x 
In the course of establishing a global stability result for stable games, Hofbauer and
Sandholm (2009) show that the time derivative of   satisﬁes
˙  (x) ≤ ˙ x DF(x)˙ x 
with equality holding precisely at the Nash equilibria of F. To ﬁnish the proof of Theo-
rem 1(i), it is enough to show that
˙ x DF(x)˙ x+C(10) ˙ x ≤ 0
for all x ∈ O  −{ x∗}. This follows directly from the following lemma and choosing
C ≥ M/N.
Lemma 1. Let ˙ x = VF(x) be a pairwise comparison dynamic for F and let x∗ be a regular
ESS of F. Then there is a neighborhood O  of x∗ and constants M N >0 such that for all
x ∈ O ,
(i) ˙ x DF(x)˙ x ≤ M(10) x
(ii) (10) ˙ x ≤− N(10) x.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that S(x∗) = support(x∗) is given by {1     
n∗}. Then to complement 10 ∈ Rn,l e t1∗ ∈ Rn be the vector whose ﬁrst n∗ components
equal 1 andwhose remaining componentsequal 0,s ot h a t1∗+10 = 1 ≡ (1     1) .N e x t ,
decompose the identity matrix I as I∗ + I0,w h e r eI∗ = diag(1∗) and I0 = diag(10),a n d ,
ﬁnally,decomposeI∗ as ∗+ ∗,wher e ∗ = (1/n∗)1∗(1∗)  and ∗ = I∗− ∗. Noticethat
 ∗ is the orthogonal projection of Rn onto TX∩ Rn
S(x∗) ={ z ∈ Rn
0 :

j∈S zj = 0  and zj =
0 whenever j/ ∈ S(x∗)} and that I =  ∗ +  ∗ + I0. Note also that if x∗ ∈ int(X), then this
decomposition becomes I =  + +0,w h e r e  = I −(1/n)11  and   = (1/n)11  are the
orthogonalprojectionsofRn ontoTX={ z ∈ Rn:

j∈S zj = 0}andspan({1}),respectively.44 William H. Sandholm Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Using this decomposition of the identity matrix, we can write
˙ x DF(x)˙ x = (( ∗ + ∗ +I0)˙ x) DF(x)(( ∗ + ∗ +I0)˙ x)
= ( ∗˙ x) DF(x)( ∗ ˙ x)+(( ∗ +I0)˙ x) DF(x)˙ x (21)
+( ∗˙ x) DF(x)(( ∗ +I0)˙ x) 
Because x∗ is a regular ESS, we know that z DF(x∗)z < 0 for all nonzero z ∈ TX∪Rn
S(x∗).
Thus, because DF(x) is continuous in x, there is a neighborhood ˆ O of x∗ on which the
ﬁrst term of (21) is nonpositive.
Turning to the second term, note that because 1 ˙ x = 0 and (10)  = 1 I0,w eh a v et h a t




















Let  A  denote the spectral norm of the matrix A (see Horn and Johnson 1985,E x -
ample 5.6.6). Then applying the spectral norm inequalities |Ax|≤  A |x| and  AB ≤
 A  B , and the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality |x y|≤| x||y|,w eﬁ n dt h a t

















	 DF(x) |˙ x| 
Because DF(x), VF(x),a n dρij(F(x) x) are continuous in x, and hence bounded, on










	 DF(x) |˙ x|≤K and max
i j∈S
ρij(F(x) x) ≤ R for all x ∈ X  (22)
Now because x∗ is a quasistrict equilibrium, we have that Fi(x∗) = ¯ F(x∗)>F j(x∗)
for all i ∈ support(x∗) ={ 1     n∗} and all j/ ∈ support(x∗). Thus, because the protocol
ρij(π x) = φj(πj −πi) is sign preserving, we have ρij(F(x∗) x∗) = 0 for such i and j,a n d
because F is continuous, there is a neighborhood O  ⊆ ˆ O of x∗ on which for such i and
j we have Fi(x) > Fj(x), and hence ρij(F(x) x) = 0. From this argument and the bound




















































= 2Rn(10) x 
We therefore conclude that at all x ∈ O ,
(( ∗ +I0)˙ x) DF(x)˙ x ≤ 2KRn(10) x 
Essentially the same argument provides a similar bound on the third term of (21), com-
pleting the proof of part (i) of the lemma.
We proceed with the proof of part (ii) of the lemma. Following the line of argument
after equation (22) above, we note that because x∗ is quasistrict and because the pair-
wise comparison dynamic satisﬁes sign preservation, we have ρji(F(x∗) x∗)>0 and
ρij(F(x∗) x∗) = 0 whenever i ∈ support(x∗) ={ 1     n∗} and j/ ∈ support(x∗).S o ,b e c a u s e
F and ρ are continuous, sign preservation implies that there is a neighborhood O  of
x∗ and an r>0 such that ρji(F(x) x) > r and ρij(F(x) x) = 0 for all i ≤ n∗, j>n ∗,a n d
x ∈ O . Applying this observation and canceling like terms when both j and k are greater
than n∗ in the sums below, we ﬁnd that for all x ∈ O ,
































≤− rn∗(10) x 
This completes the proof of the lemma.  
The lemma completes the proof of Theorem 1(i).  
Proof of Theorem 1(ii). Let ˙ x = VF(x) be a separable excess payoff dynamic for F
deﬁnedbyrevisionprotocolρij(π x) = φj(πj−x π).D e ﬁ n et h eC1 function x∗ :X → R
by
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where the constant C>0 is determined later. Hofbauer and Sandholm (2009) show that
the function   is nonnegative, with  (x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ NE(F),a n dt h a t
˙  (x) ≤ ˙ x DF(x)˙ x 
with equality holding precisely at the Nash equilibria of F. Therefore, the result follows
if we can show that
˙ x DF(x)˙ x+C(10) ˙ x ≤ 0
for all x ∈ O  −{x∗}. This inequality follows directly from the following lemma, choosing
C ≥ K.
Lemma 2. Let ˙ x = VF(x) be the separable excess payoff dynamic for F deﬁned by revi-
sion protocol ρij(π x) = φj(πj − x π),a n dl e tx∗ be a regular ESS of F. Then there is a
neighborhood O  of x∗ and a K>0 such that for all x ∈ O , we have
(i) ˙ x DF(x)˙ x ≤ KT(x)(10) x
(ii) (10) ˙ x =− T(x)(10) x,
where T(x)=

j∈S φj( ˆ Fj(x)).
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows the same lines as that of Lemma 1,b u tw i t h
inequalities (23)a n d( 24)r e p l a c e db y( 26)a n d( 25)b e l o w .
Suppose again that support(x∗) ={ 1     n∗}.B e c a u s ex∗ is quasistrict, we have that
Fi(x∗) = ¯ F(x∗)>F j(x∗) for all i ∈ support(x∗) ={ 1     n∗} and all j/ ∈ support(x∗).T h u s ,
because the protocol ρij(π x) = φj(πj − x π) is sign preserving, we have φj( ˆ F(x∗
j)) = 0
whenever j/ ∈ support(x∗),a n db e c a u s eF is continuous, there is a neighborhood O  ⊆ ˆ O
ofx∗ onwhichforsuchj wehavethat ¯ F(x∗)>F j(x∗),andhencethatφj( ˆ Fj(x)) = 0.T h i s
implies in turn that for x ∈ O ,w eh a v e











































˙ xj = T(x)(10) x  (26)Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics 47
The proof otherwise follows that of Lemma 1.  
The proof of Theorem 1(ii) is now complete.  
Proof of Theorem 1(iii). Let ˙ x ∈ VF(x) ≡ argmaxy∈X y F(x)− x be the best response
dynamic for F. Deﬁne the Lipschitz continuous function






Hofbauer (2001)a n dHofbauer and Sandholm (2009) show that M is nonnegative, with
M(x)= 0 if and only if x ∈ NE(F), and that along each solution trajectory {xt}t≥0,w e
have
˙ M(xt) = (˙ xt) DF(xt)˙ xt −M(xt)
for almost all t ≥ 0. Therefore, by standard results on Lyapunov functions for differential
inclusions (see Theorems A.2 and A.3 of Hofbauer and Sandholm 2009), the result will
follow if we show that
˙ x DF(x)˙ x+C(10) ˙ x ≤ 0
for all x ∈ O  −{ x∗} and all ˙ x ∈ VF(x). This inequality follows from the following lemma,
setting C ≥ K.
Lemma 3. Let ˙ x ∈ VF(x) ≡ argmaxy∈X y F(x)−x be the best response dynamic for F,a n d
let x∗ be a regular ESS of F. Then there is a neighborhood O  of x∗ and a K>0 such that
for all x ∈ O  and ˙ x ∈ VF(x), we have
(i) ˙ x DF(x)˙ x ≤ K(10) x
(ii) (10) ˙ x =− (10) x.
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows the same lines as that of Lemma 1,b u tw i t h
inequalities (23)a n d( 24)r e p l a c e db y( 28)a n d( 27)b e l o w .
Suppose once again that support(x∗) ={ 1     n∗}. If we choose the neighborhood
O  as we did in the proof of Lemma 2,t h e nn oj>n ∗ is optimal at any x ∈ O . Thus, for
such x and any ˙ x ∈ VF(x),w eh a v e


















˙ xj = (10) x  (28)
The proof otherwise follows that of Lemma 1.  
The proof of Theorem 1(iii) is now complete.  48 William H. Sandholm Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
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